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Abstract: (a) Topics and Goals. The Junior Research Group »Place, Space and Motion« investigates the role
of spatial concepts in physical theories in the millennium from Plato (4th century BCE) through Philoponus
and Simplicius (6th century CE). In particular, we examine the explicit theoretical views of ancient physicists
and philosophers concerning space, the spatial features of bodies, and the existence of isomorphisms 
among space, change, and time. Projects are devoted to issues in Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Physics, 
and to the interwoven reception of these texts in Middle Platonism and Late Platonism. We trace the evolv-
ing answers given to such central questions as whether space is metaphysically basic or is rather dependent 
upon bodies or even non-spatial entities (such as souls); the possibility of empty space; the causal role of 
space in nature; how spatial structures make certain kinds of change possible or necessary. The group aims 
to produce a series of essays and commentaries examining key texts of Plato and Aristotle and tracing the 
reception and transformation of their views in Middle- and Late Platonism.
(b) Methods. The group engages in close reading and interpretation of ancient texts, with the aim of con-
structing a history of engagement with the questions indicated above. The main areas of expertise brought 
to bear on the relevant texts lie in classical philology, history of ideas, history of science, and systematic 
philosophy. In a weekly research seminar, individual research projects and results are presented in detail 
and discussed in the light of these varied disciplines and skill sets.
(c) State of Discussion. Relevant texts are interpreted both internally and in the light of their relationships 
with earlier sources and later readings. In this way a narrative is emerging of development and interrela-
tionship among ancient theories of space – a narrative with some shape and coherence, but without the 
suppression of details and uncertainties. The group is also beginning to pay more attention to epistemo-
logical issues, concerning the sources of theoretical knowledge about space, and the evolving standards of 
argument, justifi cation, and presentation of such knowledge.
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Plato and Aristotle initiated a tradition of explicit, theoretical refl ection on the notion of 
space or place as it fi gures in metaphysics and natural philosophy. Their theories were 
received and transformed in various ways throughout antiquity. Our group traces the
history of this tradition from Plato through Aristotle up to their late ancient interpreters.
Our central question is: To which sorts of explicit and theoretical knowledge about space 
did physicists and philosophers lay claim in antiquity? This is meant to complement 
the many other questions about space and knowledge being investigated within Topoi, 
for example: What sorts of implicit or practical knowledge did people have about space 
in antiquity? How was knowledge of various kinds acquired, preserved, or transmitted 
through the use of spatial structures – such as buildings, monuments, or diagrams? How 
did knowledge of various kinds – such as technological innovations – spread across space 
from community to community?
Aristotle’s theoretical account of the nature of place and related phenomena set the terms 
of almost all subsequent ancient philosophical debates over spatial concepts. His account 
was the product of a critical engagement with predecessors’ views on the same issues,
and above all with the theory of »space« (chora) presented in Plato’s Timaeus. Aristotle
rejected the Timaean account of space, but not before carrying out a highly infl uential
project of clarifi cation or correction (or perhaps distortion?) of the concepts employed in 
that account. Aristotle’s efforts in this direction guided all later readings of the Platonic 
dialogue. For this reason, a history of the period under study requires ample attention to 
Aristotle’s conceptual framework and his positive views.
1.1 Aristotle
Aristotle’s treatise on place, Physics 4.1–5, provides his offi cial positive account of place, 
along with his infl uential reading of the theory of space presented in Plato’s Timaeus. 
An authoritative reconstruction of the theory endorsed in this treatise was published a 
few years before the beginning of Topoi (MORISON 2002), and we have no intention of 
trying to replace MORISON’s account. Instead, our work on the treatise is focused on its 
forward- and backward-looking historical relationships; we study it in connection with 
the interpretation and criticisms offered by later commentators (cf. section 1.3 below), 
and with a view toward understanding why Aristotle believed the Timaean theory of space 
should be understood as a theory on which space is matter (cf. section 1.2 below). We also 
consider how Aristotle might have responded to certain objections to his account of place 
raised by later commentators.
Physics 4 does not provide the whole story of Aristotle’s theoretical engagement with 
space. The places of Physics 4 are two-dimensional surfaces, and to be in such a place is
to be surrounded by it. On many other theories, space and places are three-dimensional, 
and to be in a place is to occupy it, in such a way as to be coextensive with it. For vari-
ous reasons, Aristotle came to the view that no theory along the latter lines can be made 
to work. He recognizes, of course, that bodies are extended in three dimensions, and he 
examines the structure of bodily extension in detail in Physics 5–6. He does not speak
of himself as examining the structure of space, but it is fair to describe him as at least
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4offering a study of spatial extension. (His reasons for maintaining that such extension is 
no more than an aspect or quasi-constituent of bodies, not something independent, may
help explain why he regards Plato’s chora as something akin to matter.)
Aristotle’s study treats the structure of bodily extension in parallel with the structures of 
change and of time. He argues for various isomorphisms among these three structures. 
For the most part, he derives features of change and time from features of spatial exten-
sion, but sometimes the direction of argument is different: in one passage, for example, 
he uses principles about faster and slower motion to argue simultaneously for the infi nite 
divisibility of time and of spatial extension. Aristotle argues for a number of theses which 
are no longer accepted today, representative examples being
a) no motion can reverse direction without an extended interval of rest in between
(false according to infi nitessimal calculus – 17th century),
b) no magnitude or time is composed out of points or instants
(false according to set theory – late 19th century).
The broad outlines of Aristotle’s views – and their defects according to modern math-
ematics – are fairly well understood, but many of his arguments for those views have 
proven enigmatic even in their outlines and methods. Drawing on the group’s combined 
competencies in mathematics, philosophy, and philology, we are developing reconstruc-
tions of Aristotle’s arguments step by step and clarifying the order of interdependence 
among his various theses.
Certain of Aristotle’s arguments about motion employ a rather subtle method of argu-
ment which involves, at a crucial step, assuming as true a statement which has only been 
asserted to be possible. The method of argument, as it turns out, appears in a number of 
diffi cult and controversial passages in Aristotle, and becames a point of common interest
between our group and our colleague Marko Malink in group D-III-E-II-1 (Dialectical 
Topoi). In collaboration with Malink, we have prepared a detailed treatment of the argu-
mentative method in question, and shown that it is in principle valid (although in some 
cases Aristotle applies the method in a faulty way).
Not only does change in general share structural features with spatial extension; Aristotle
also holds that the most fundamental kind of change is locomotion, change of place. In 
part this is because, he thinks, circular locomotion is the only viable candidate for an 
eternal and continuous change, and an eternal continuous change deserves a rank of high 
priority. Aristotle moreover ascribes ontological priority to locomotion: the existence
of other kinds of change depends on the existence of locomotion, but not vice versa.
A dissertation project within our group has led to greater clarity about the sense in which 
locomotion for Aristotle is prior to other changes, and why its priority is crucial to his 
systematic account of change in the cosmos.
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51.2 Plato and Later Platonism
We revisit Plato’s theory of chora with a critical eye on Aristotle’s infl uential assimila-
tion of chora to a sort of matter. Plato’s view of space in the Timaeus turns out to be
impossible to align in any straightforward way with contemporary ways of thinking
about either space or matter. This is related to the fact that he doesn’t seem to think of 
there being sensible »objects« which are the subjects of properties (hypokeimena), and 
yet does think that any perceptible change has to have something underlying it (again
hypokeimenon). As a result, he posits a certain »something « – space, or chora – that
underlies perceptible changes (like matter), but (unlike matter) is not a constituent of any 
perceptible objects. This very same thing is indeterminately extended (like space), but 
not causally neutral (like Newtonian space). One promising avenue toward making sense 
of this constellation is through a return to the idea, regarded in recent years as contro-
versial, that Plato held a broadly Heraclitean view of sensible reality. On such a view, the 
sensible world cannot be parceled into things or objects; to describe it we need, to put it 
with Strawson, a »language without individuals.« Such a radical rejection of the ordinary 
metaphysics of bodily objects carries with it a radically different approach to questions of 
space.
The Platonic tradition did not for the most part maintain this ambiguous status for chora
between space and matter; under Aristotle’s infl uence, Platonists settled on an interpre-
tation of chora as matter. Research within the group traces this development in the
Middle Platonists Plutarch and Alcinous. In Plutarch the topic is bound together with 
questions of the origin of evil, on which Plutarch shows a combination of reliance on and 
independence from Aristotle in his interpretation of Plato. He follows Aristotle in regard-
ing chora in the Timaeus as matter, but on the other hand he resists Aristotle’s report
(Metaphysics Α 6) that matter for Plato is the source of evil; instead he takes over from 
Plato’s Laws the postulate of an evil soul that originates all other evil. In Alcinous we fi nd
a summary of Timaean physics, which is often regarded as a faithful one, but can be seen
to suffer Aristotelian distortions both in its treatment of chora as matter and in its unwill-
ingness to take seriously Timaeus’s composition of material elements (earth, water, etc.) 
out of geometrical entities.
Related trends led Plotinus to develop an original and historically infl uential Platonist 
conception of fi rst (or »prime«) matter. Like his Platonist predecessors, Plotinus accepted 
Aristotle’s interpretation of the »receptacle« in Plato’s Timaeus as matter, but at the same
time reassessed the traditional understanding of what it is to be a material substratum. 
According to Plotinus’s view, certain substrata, including in particular fi rst matter, are not 
subjects of the properties that inhere in them, in such a way that they would be affected
by the acquisition and loss of those properties. This innovative account of the relation 
between matter and the properties it underlies was motivated by an attempt to defend 
Platonic views against Aristotle’s criticisms, and it represents a unique approach to 
traditional puzzles about substantial change. Plotinus’s new theory of the substratum is 
foundational for his thesis that prime matter itself is devoid of extensional properties, and 
provides the relevant context for understanding his metaphorical interpretation of Plato’s
descriptions of the »receptacle« as »space« (chora) and »place« (topos).









Friederike Fless – Gerd Graßhoff – Michael Meyer (eds.) | Reports of the Research Groups at the Topoi 
Plenary Session 2010 | © 2011 eTopoi. Journal for Ancient Studies (ISSN 2192-2608) http://journal.topoi.org
61.3 Aristotle in Later Platonism
So much for Aristotle’s infl uence on the interpretation of Timaean space among later 
Platonists. But Platonists were also busy interpreting and battling Aristotle himself. This 
history is examined by way of the commentaries written on Aristotle’s Physics in the 6th 
century CE by Simplicius and Philoponus. These commentaries include digressions or 
›corollaries‹in which the authors present their own views in contrast with the Aristotelian 
theories under interpretation; they also, especially in Simplicius’s case, provide a wealth 
of information about other Neoplatonists’s theories of space.
Thus, in Simplicius and Philoponus we fi nd detailed and sympathetic exegesis placed
side by side with emphatic criticism and rejection of certain Aristotelian commitments.
In one context, the commentator may argue against attributing a certain view to Aristotle 
on the grounds that this view is absurd and implausible; in the other context, the same
commentator may argue that Aristotle’s views are, if not absurd and implausible, then
at any rate false. The combination is interesting not just because of the innovative liter-
ary strategies used to achieve it. It suggests that these commentators wanted to know not 
just about space; they wanted to know what Aristotle knew (or thought he knew) about 
space. They did not interpret Aristotle as an authority through which to arrive at the truth 
(as one might interpret the Bible, or Marx, or as Platonists read Plato and the Peripatetics
read Aristotle), nor as a mere inspiration or foil for better views (as Aristotle treated his 
own predecessors); apparently, Aristotle’s views themselves were valued as objects of 
knowledge. What motivated this attitude? In part, no doubt, there was an urgent wish to 
preserve the impressive »pagan« intellectual legacy which had come under threat during 
the rise of Christianity. This motive is obvious in Simplicius, who sometimes copies out 
whole passages from books that have become rare and hard to fi nd; for Philoponus (him-
self a Christian), other motives may be at work.
Simplicius’s Corollary on Place is our richest source of information for late ancient theories
of space and place and for Neoplatonist interpretations of Aristotle’s Physics 4.1–5. It 
includes summaries and evaluations of the views of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus,
Proclus, and Damascius, as well as Simplicius’s own theory of space, which differs only 
in minor details from that of his teacher Damascius. A detailed running commentary 
is underway, including a reconstruction of Proclus’s and Damascius’s works On Place. 
Both works are now lost, but were still available to Simplicius, who makes use of them 
in his Corollary. In this context, especially Proclus’s view on place as incorporeal light is 
remarkable for two reasons: (a) it differs fundamentally from other Neoplatonic theories 
of place, and (b) it was later adopted by the Renaissance philosopher Francesco Patrizi. It 
emerges that within a Neoplatonic tradition beginning with Iamblichus (3rd century CE), 
space is considered as a power or force (dunamis), a formal principle that actively struc-
tures the things that are in space. Neoplatonists derived from Plato’s Timaeus the idea 
that cosmic space is ensouled and hence active/dynamic. This is diametrically opposed 
to Aristotle’s notion, rejected by late ancient authors, on which space is regarded as a 
mere container. The project involves collaboration with Philippe Hoffmann (Paris, Centre 
national de la recherche scientifi que) and Pantelis Golitsis (Aristoteles Archiv, Berlin) 
who have prepared a new edition of Simplicius’ Corollary on Place [http://www.teuchos.
uni-hamburg.de/pdf].
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7Simplicius’s contemporary Philoponus supplements his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
with two Corollaries which offer criticisms of Aristotle’s account of place and his denial 
of void, respectively. A dissertation project within the group examines these two related 
texts. One result is that we should distinguish two different strategies in Philoponus for 
supplementing his running commentary with an exposition of his own views; in terms of 
this distinction it is better to speak of »digressions on place and void« (because they inter-
rupt the otherwise reigning theoria-lexis form of his commentary, whereas the »Corollaries«
fi t within that form). The dissertation provides a reconstruction of Philoponus’s theory of 
place and positions it in relation to the various Neoplatonist views laid out by Simplicius. 
Philoponus’s insistence on the possibility of void requires, on the one hand, an account of 
place as something independent enough of bodies so that it can exist while being empty; 
for a void is precisely an empty place. It also requires answers to Aristotle’s arguments 
against the possibility of motion through a void: explanations why a body falling through 
empty space will not fall infi nitely fast, and why a body thrown through empty space will 
keep moving once there is nothing around to keep pushing or carrying it. Philoponus 
answered the latter question by developing an impetus theory of motion, which prefi gured 
and infl uenced later theories of inertia. Thus his »digression on void« represents a crucial 
stage between ancient Aristotelian thinking about nature and early modern thinking.
Finally, there is a project on Proclus’s epitome of Aristotle’s Physics 6–8, called the
Elements of Physics. Modelled after Euclid’s Elements, Proclus’s small treatise consisting 
of defi nitions and proofs has always been considered an early and purely ›Aristotelian‹ 
production by this Neoplatonist. To the contrary, we are convinced that Proclus’s method 
of arranging and summarizing his material displays characteristically Neoplatonic com-
mitments and readings of Aristotle. We are preparing the fi rst English translation with 
running commentary of the treatise, in which Proclus’s interpretation is compared with 
Themistius’s Paraphrase of the Physics and, more importantly, with Simplicius’s com-
mentary on Physics 6–8. It is our (partly confi rmed) suspicion that parts of Simplicius’s 
commentary can be traced to the infl uence of Proclus’s epitome.
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4 Conferences and Workshops
International Workshop on Late Ancient Philosophy (together with Philipp Hoffmann, 
Centre national de la recherche scientifi que Paris, and Carlos Steel, University of Leuven): 
»The corollaries in the Commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics by Simplicius and Philoponus«.
24.–25. June 2010.
International Conference (together with D-I-2 Anima mundi): »The World Soul and
Cosmic Space«. 17.–18. September 2010. 
Summer school and workshop »Plato’s Sophist«, with Laszlo Bene, Lesley Brown, Sarah 
Broadie, Amber Carpenter, Irad Kimhi, and Fiona Leigh. 21.–24. September 2009.
(Financed by the Schneider-Stiftung.)
5 Seminars
Topoi Research Seminar (Jonathan Beere – Christoph Helmig):
• »Simplicius’ Corollary on Place«, WS 2008/2009.
• »Aristotle and the Aristotelian Commentators on the Void«, SS 2009.
• »Plato’s notion of chora in the Timaeus«, WS 2009/2010.
• »Plato’s notion of chora in Aristotle and the Later Platonic Tradition«, SS 2010.
• »Aristotle on the Topology of Change and the Priority of Locomotion«, WS 2010/2011.
»Philosophische Themen in antiker Mathematik«, WS 2008/2009 (Jonathan Beere).
»Current Research in Ancient Philosophy«, SS 2009 (Jonathan Beere).
»Zeit, Raum und Veränderung in Aristoteles’ Physik«, SS 2009 (Jonathan Beere).
»Modal Arguments in Aristotle«, WS 2009/2010 (Jacob Rosen – Marko Malink [D-III-E-2-1]).
»Platons Staat«, WS 2009/2010 (Jonathan Beere).
»Simplikios aus Kilikien: Prologe zu den Aristoteleskommentaren«, WS 2009/2010 
(Christoph Helmig).
»Philosophie der Mathematik in Hinblick auf ihre Geschichte«, SS 2010 (Jonathan Beere).
»Platons Timaios«, SS 2010 (Georgia Mouroutsou).
»Aristoteles’ Naturphilosophie«, WS 2010/2011 (Jonathan Beere).
»Aristotle’s Physics in Late Antiquity: Proclus’ Elements of Physics«, WS 2010/2011 
(Christoph Helmig/Jan Opsomer).
»Der Späte Platon: Der Politikos«, WS 2010/2011 (Georgia Mouroutsou).
»Plotinus«, WS 2010/2011 (Christopher Noble).
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